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Companies in South Africa have a separate legal existence and this gives shareholders limited 
liability. If a company cannot pay its debts, creditors will generally have no recourse against 
shareholders or directors in respect of those debts. The real problem arises if the separate 
personality if the company has been abused by shareholders and/or directors. The remedy of 
piercing the corporate veil was a common law remedy used by courts in an attempt to remedy 
the abuse of the corporate personality by directors and shareholders of the company. It 
became a statutory remedy in relation to companies when it was codified in the Companies 
Act 2008. Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 does not give any guidance as to the 
conduct which constitutes ‘unconscionable abuse’ and leaves it open for interpretation by 
court. The potential for abuse may be increased by the creation of company groups. 
This dissertation seeks to analyse and examine the statutory piercing of the corporate veil 
with the objective of providing a guideline to interpreting the meaning of ‘unconscionable 
abuse’ in the general context and then in the context of groups of companies. This research 
assesses whether piercing of the corporate veil protects creditors and investors in cases where 
corporate identity is abused, especially in the context of company groups. There is the hope 
that the research becomes a potent tool in providing creditors with guidelines and insight into 
determining ‘unconscionable abuse’ generally and then with respect to company groups, 
especially where letters of comfort have been involved. Finally, this research will give insight 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In South African company law, shareholders of companies enjoy limited liability because a 
company is regarded as a separate legal entity that exists on its own as a juristic person.1 In this 
respect a company is regarded as having a corporate identity upon its incorporation.2 This means 
that a company is liable for its own debts and shareholders are not normally liable.3  
However, the courts and the legislature have recognised that the corporate identity of a company 
has the potential to be abused by shareholders and/or directors.4 An example of this abuse is 
when a company is used as an ‘alter ego’.5 This occurs where the company conducts the business 
of the controlling members and does not carry on its own business or affairs.6 The company, in 
this case, is merely an avenue for the controlling members to carry on their own personal 
business.7 This results in the abuse of the separateness of the company.8 Another example of the 
abuse of the separate legal existence of a company is the use of a company to commit fraud.9 The 
case of Cape Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments Limited10 is an example of the piercing of 
the corporate veil where there was fraud.11 In these instances, the shareholders and/or directors 
would have conducted the affairs of the company for their own personal gain or benefit and then 
                                                 
1 Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipality 1920 AD 530 550. The concept of the separate legal existence of a company 
came from the English case of Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 (HL) 30. 
2 Section 14 (1) of the Companies Act 2008. 
3 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 (HL) 30. 
4 Amlin (SA) Pty Limited v Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 (C) para 22. 
5 Wallersteiner v Moir [1974] 3 All ER 217 (CA). 
6 ibid 238. 
7 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 234. 
8 ibid 196. 
9 This may occur when shareholders incorporate a limited liability company that does not have enough capital to 
operate efficiently. The shareholders can cause the company to incur huge debts in its own name, with little or no 
hope of being able to meet these debts. When the creditors pursue payment, the shareholders and/or directors argue 
that they are not liable for the debt because the company is the debtor and is a separate legal person. See V Khanna 
‘To Strictly Maintain the Salomon Principle or Not: That is the question?’ 2 available at 
http://www.privatelawtutor.co.uk/pdf/salomon_principle.pdf accessed on 03 February 2015. 
10 Cape Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments Limited 1995 (4) SA 790 (A). 
11 ibid 800. 
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they may want to hide behind the corporate veil as the company incurs the liabilities that arise as 
a result of the transaction made in its name.12  
The problem is that the company as a separate legal entity may not be able to pay those debts and 
normally shareholders are not liable for the debts of the company.13 The other problem is that if a 
company is liquidated either as a result of the abuse of the separate legal existence or poor 
management, the consequences of liquidation are borne by the creditors and not the wrongdoers, 
that is, shareholders and/or directors.14 However, there is a way to impose liability on the 
shareholders and/or directors. As stated in Lategan and Another NNO v Boyes and Another,15 
this can be done through the courts which may grant an order to pierce the corporate veil upon 
application by the aggrieved party.16 The remedy of piercing the corporate veil allows a 
disgruntled party to get an order from the court which will treat the rights and liabilities of the 
company as those of the shareholders and or directors.17 
‘Piercing the corporate veil is a common law remedy’ and it was relied on by the plaintiff in the 
case of Hulse Ruetter v Godde.18 The Companies Act of 1973 contained provisions that allowed 
courts to hold the controllers personally liable for debts of the company in certain circumstances, 
but these provisions did not directly give courts discretion to pierce the corporate veil.19 Some of 
these provisions include section 50(3),20 section 66,21 section 172(5)b,22 section 280(5),23 section 
                                                 
12 Dadoo (note 1 above; 548). 
13 Cape Pacific (note 10 above; 814). 
14 D J Baker et al ‘Corporate Governance of Troubled Companies and the Role of Restructuring Counsel’ 2008 
63(3) The Business Lawyer 855 873 available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40688514.pdf?acceptTC=true 
accessed on 03 February 2015. 
15 Lategan and Another NNO v Boyes and Another 1980 (4) SA 191 (T). 
16 ibid 201. 
17 Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd [1991] 4 All SA 769 (CA) 779. 
18 D Subramanien ‘“Unconscionable abuse” - section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 Ex Parte Gore NNO 
2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC): cases’ (2014) 35(1) Obiter 150 150 available at 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/obiter/obiter_v35_n1_a11.pdf accessed on 3 March 
2015. 
19 R Cassim Contemporary Company Law 2 ed Cape Town Juta (2013) 63. Cassim states that being held personally 
liable for loss, costs or damages incurred by the company was a form of piercing of the corporate veil under the 
Companies Act 1973. 
20 Section 50(3) provides that if a director, officer or any person on the company’s behalf issues or signs a bill of 
exchange, a promissory note, a cheque or an order for money or for goods on behalf of the company (or authorises 
the issue or signing of such a document) in which the registered name of the company is not cited in the correct 
manner, it will amount to an offence. That person will be personally liable to the holder of that bill of exchange, 
promissory note, cheque or order for the amount thereof, unless it is duly paid by the company. 
3 
 
344(h)24 and section 424(1).25 The remedy was initially codified within the corporate laws of 
South Africa, in section 65 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (hereafter the Close 
Corporations Act 1984).26 This remedy which allowed for piercing of the corporate veil in 
instances where there has been ‘gross abuse’ of the separate corporate form……applied only to 
close corporations. the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter the Companies Act 2008) which 
repealed most of the 1973 Companies Act introduced a new statutory veil piercing remedy in 
section 20(9) which seems to echo the approach adopted in the Close Corporations Act.27 In 
essence, section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 gives the courts the discretion to pierce the 
corporate veil when the activity by the company amounts to ‘unconscionable abuse’.28  
Although the section makes provision for a valuable remedy which would be available to 
creditors and investors, unfortunately it does not seem to give any guidance as to the conduct 
which constitutes ‘unconscionable abuse’ and leaves it open for interpretation by court. The 
laymen or creditors in the commercial arena do not know what may constitute ‘unconscionable 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 Section 66 provides that where a public company carries on business for more than six months while it has less 
than seven members, every person who is a member of the company during the time that it carries on business after 
those six months shall be personally liable for the payment of the debts of the company incurred during that time. 
22 Section 172(5)b provides that until a certificate is issued permitting the company to commence business any debts 
or liabilities incurred prior to receipt of the certificate is the joint and several liability of the directors and the 
members of the company. 
23 Section 280(5) provides that if the directors of a Company fail to appoint an auditor to fulfil a vacancy after the 
receipt of written notice to do so by the Registrar the directors and the company shall be held jointly and severally 
liable for any debts incurred by the company during the existence of the vacancy. 
24 Section 344(h) provides that a company may be wound up by the Court if it appears to the Court that it is just and 
equitable to do so. The actual state of affairs between the members may be looked at in determining whether the 
circumstances justify the winding up. 
25 Section 424(1) of the Companies Act 1973. 
26 The section provides that, ‘Whenever a Court on application by an interested person, or in any proceedings in 
which a corporation is involved, finds that the incorporation of, or any act by or on behalf of, or any use of, that 
corporation, constitutes a gross abuse of the juristic personality of the corporation as a separate entity, the Court may 
declare that the corporation is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of such rights, obligations or 
liabilities of the corporation, or of such member or members thereof, or of such other person or persons, as are 
specified in the declaration, and the Court may give such further order or orders as it may deem fit in order to give 
effect to such declaration.’ 
27 Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. The section provides that, ‘If, on application by an interested person or 
in any proceedings in which a company is involved, a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any use of 
the company, or any act by or on behalf of the company, constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic 
personality of the company as a separate entity, the court may –  (a) declare that the company is to be deemed not to 
be a juristic person in respect of any right, obligation or liability of the company or of a shareholder of the company 
or, in the case of a non- profit company, a member of the company, or of another person specified in the declaration; 
and (b) make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect to a declaration contemplated in 
paragraph (a).’ 
28 Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. 
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abuse’ in terms of section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 and the circumstances in which the 
court are likely to pierce the corporate veil. There is the need for the laymen (creditors and/or 
investors) to understand the difference between ‘unconscionable abuse’,29 ‘gross abuse’30 and the 
test that was formulated in the case of Botha v Van Niekerk,31 which is ‘unconscionable injustice’ 
whilst applying the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil.32 Just as there is the 
potential for the abuse of the separate legal personality in the context of one company there is the 
possibility of similar abuse in the context of a group of companies.33 
As stated in the case of Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Limited v Ebrahim and Others,34 companies 
are recognised by law as juristic persons and each company within a group of companies has a 
separate legal existence.35 Each company can be sued in its own capacity to the exclusion of all 
other companies in the group; and the courts have normally not treated groups an entity.36 The 
parent company as a shareholder in the subsidiary is not normally liable for any debts of the 
subsidiary.37 The problem is that there is a temptation to use the corporate structure of the 
subsidiary to evade obligations of the parent and to manipulate the credit of the subsidiary to 
support transactions which may not benefit investors and/or creditors of the subsidiary.38 There is 
also the problem that the group of companies can protect the assets of one part of the business 
from claims arising from the activities of the other part of the business (that is, entity 
shielding).39 Furthermore, as stated in the case of Van Zyl v Kaye,40 the parent company may 
exercise excessive control over the subsidiary such that the subsidiary would not be able to 
                                                 
29 ibid. 
30 The term used in section 65 of the Close Corporations Act of 1984. 
31 Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 (3) SA 513 (W). 
32 ibid 515. 
33 R Cassim ‘Hiding Behind the Veil’ (2013) De Rebus 34 35. 
34 Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Limited v Ebrahim and Others 2008 (2) SA 303. 
35 ibid para 15. 
36 H W Ballantine ‘Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations’ (1925) California L R 14(1) 12 13 
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3475351 accessed on 17 July 2014. 
37 Airport Cold Storage (note 34 above; para 15). 
38 A Berle ‘Subsidiary Corporations and Credit Manipulation’ (1927-1928) Harv L Rev 41 874 892 available at 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/hlr41&div=57&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=0
&men_tab=srchresults&terms=SUBSIDIARY|C|P|ATIONS|CREDIT&type=matchall accessed on 2 August 2014. 
39 E Ferran Principles of Corporate Finance Law 2011 26. 
40 Van Zyl v Kaye 2014(4) SA 452. 
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operate as an independent entity.41 In such a case the creditors might not understand whether the 
group of companies is a single unit or whether it consists of a number of separate legal entities.  
In addition to the above, there is the problem of the use of letters of comfort that are frequently 
used in the context of groups of companies.42 These letters are used in a situation where the 
subsidiary borrows money from a lender and the parent company issues a letter of comfort to the 
lender, instead of issuing a letter of guarantee or signing as surety for the debt.43 The legal status 
of letters of comfort is uncertain.44 Normally, they do not create legally enforceable 
obligations.45 However, the letters of comfort continue to be in use because they are convenient 
to the parent company in the sense that they require less formalities than guarantees and on the 
balance sheet of the parent company, the letter of comfort will not create a potential liability.46 In 
as much as the letters of comfort are convenient, there is the possibility that parent companies 
may abuse letters of comfort and also manipulate the credit of the subsidiary to support 
transactions which may not benefit investors and/or creditors of the subsidiary.47 In the event that 
the subsidiary is not able to pay the debts, the shareholder will not be liable for those debts.48 In 
the light of these problems, the research will also look at groups of companies and what 
constitutes ‘unconscionable abuse’ in the context of groups of companies. 
                                                 
41 ibid para 33. 
42 L Schulz ‘Letters of Comfort: where do we stand?’ (2013) Australian Banking and Finance law Bulletin 34 34 
available at http://www.minterellison.com/publications/Letters-of-comfort/ accessed on 19 March 2014. In the 
banking and finance context, a letter of comfort typically takes the form of a letter issued by a parent company or 
other related party(issuer) of a borrower to the borrower’s lender. The intention of the issuer is to provide some form 
of “comfort” to the lender in relation to the obligations of the borrower under its loan agreement. 
43 R Stevens ‘Circumventing Veil Piercing: Possible Delictual Liability of A Holding Company to a Creditor of its 
Insolvent Subsidiary’ (2013) 24(1) STELL LR 93 99 available at 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/ju_slr/ju_slr_v24_n1_a5.pdf accessed on 17 March 
2014. 
44 L Schulz (note 48 above). 
45 G A Wittuhn ‘Kleinwort Benson Limited v. Malaysian Mining Corporation Berhad -- A Comparative Note on 
Comfort Letters’ (1990) 35 McGill Law Journal 490 492 available at 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/mcgil35&div=31&collection=journals&set_as_cursor
=0&men_tab=srchresults&terms=kleinwort|benson|limited|v.|malaysian|mining|corporation|berhad|a|comparative
|note|on|comfort|letters|georg|a.|wittuhn*&type=matchall accessed on 18 September 2014. 
46 L Thai ‘Comfort letters — a fresh look?’ (2006) 17 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 15 16 
available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228283209_Comfort_Letters__A_Fresh_Look accessed on 28 
July 2014. 
47 A Berle (note 38 above). 
48 Airport Cold Storage (note 34 above; para 15). 
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The dissertation will include a comparison of the use of the remedy in the United Kingdom, and 
Australia for the purposes of supporting arguments or discussions and also to be guided by the 
approach of the jurisdictions where possible. These jurisdictions will be compared with the South 
African common law approach of piercing of the corporate veil. These jurisdictions may also 
give a guideline of how groups of companies and the use of letters of comfort can be dealt with.  
These jurisdictions have been chosen because the legal systems of these jurisdictions originated 
from Roman law, which is one of the laws from which the South African legal system originated 
from.49 
Therefore, the research serves to put creditors and investors on their guard since the corporate 
identity of a company has the potential of being abused. The dissertation is conducted in 
consideration of creditors and/or third parties dealing with groups of companies. These personas 
need to be aware of the potential problems that are associated with groups of companies and also 
to be aware that there is the statutory remedy contained in section 20(9) at their disposal. The 
dissertation provides creditors with knowledge on circumstances in which the statutory remedy 
could be used. 
This research will take a corporate legal point of view and this will be done by analysing the law 
and legal processes surrounding the remedy of piercing of the corporate veil. The study will be a 
desktop literature research which will involve the use of primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources include statute and case law. The secondary sources will be journals and articles. 
This dissertation is structured as follows. This introductory chapter has set the scene for the 
research. The chapter also gave an outline of the rationale for the study, the purpose, significance 
and goals of the research. 
Chapter 2 will consider the remedy of piercing of the corporate veil, starting with its 
development from common law to statute. The chapter will set out the statutory remedy of the 
                                                 
49 B Lenel ‘The History of South African Law and its Roman-Dutch Roots’ 2002 1 7 available at 
http://www.africanafrican.com/folder11/world%20history5/black%20history/history-of-sa-law-en.pdf accessed on 
20 May 2014. 
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piercing of the veil starting with the Close Corporations Act of 1984. There will also be a brief 
discussion of provisions in the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which allowed for wrongdoers to be 
held personally liable for loss, costs or damages incurred by the company as a result of their 
wrongdoing.  
Chapter 3 will explore the statutory remedy of piercing of the corporate veil contained in section 
20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The term ‘unconscionable abuse’, which is found in 
section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008, will be analysed. The chapter will focus on what 
courts in South Africa may consider to be ‘unconscionable abuse’. The chapter will refer to 
foreign jurisdictions to help develop arguments and where it is possible to be guided by their 
approach in respect of the use of the remedy of piercing of the corporate veil. 
Chapter 4 will highlight the nature of groups of companies and issue of ‘unconscionable abuse’ 
in that context. The chapter will briefly explore the use of letters of comfort by company groups 
and the potential abuse thereof. There will be a discussion on how creditors are affected by such 
letters of comfort and the uncertainty surrounding them. The issue of ‘unconscionable abuse’ in 
the context of letters of comfort will also be considered. 
Chapter 5 will close by summing up the findings of the entire dissertation. The comparison in the 
preceding chapters will also allow for a discussion of how a change in approach might impact on 
effectiveness of the remedy.  The chapter will include a recommendation on the possible future 
of piercing as a remedy. The dissertation concludes that statutory piercing is a viable and may be 
an effective remedy in the context of company groups where the corporate identity has been 






CHAPTER 2: PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
The remedy of ‘piercing of the corporate veil is a common law remedy’50 that has been 
developed in South Africa and has become a statutory remedy. This chapter discusses the 
development of the common law remedy and its subsequent codification in South African 
Company law. Provisions in the Companies Act of 1973 which allowed courts to impose 
personal liability on wrongdoers are discussed in this chapter. The sections include section 50(3), 
section 66, section 172(5)b, section 280(5), section 344(h) and section 424(1). There is also a 
deliberation on the statutory remedy of the piercing of the veil found in the Close Corporations 
Act of 1984. The chapter briefly refers to the position of the United Kingdom and Australia with 
respect the use the remedy of piercing of the corporate veil. Reference is made to these 
jurisdictions because the legal systems of these jurisdictions originated from Roman law, which 
is one of the laws from which the South African legal system originated from.51 
2.2 Development and codification of the common law remedy 
2.2.1 The corporate veil 
Before discussing the common law remedy it is important to first examine the nature of a 
company which creates what is metaphorically described as a ‘veil’ for the controllers. The veil 
allows controllers to be exempted from liability for debts of the company.52 
                                                 
50 Ex parte Gore (note 21 above; para 2). See also A Karapanço and I Karapanço ‘The Piercing of the Corporate 
Veil Doctrine: A Comparative Approach to the Piercing of the Corporate Veil in European Union and Albania’ 2013 
2(9) 153 154 available at http://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/ajis/article/view/829/860 accessed on 15 May 
2015. 
51 B Lenel (note 55 above). 
52 Airport Cold Storage (note 34 above; para 15). 
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It is a well-established principle in company law that once incorporated, a company is a separate 
legal entity.53 Its assets and liabilities are its own.54 This means that a company is a legal person 
which can acquire rights and incur obligations.55 Therefore, as a practical consequence of 
incorporation, the company can sue to enforce its rights and it can be sued in its own name as it 
incurs liabilities. This means that when a company is sued by an aggrieved party for performance 
or by its creditors for money it owes, it is the company that incurs liability for the performance or 
the debt. The shareholders are not normally liable for the company’s debts.56 The reason for this 
is that the corporate veil protects shareholders and directors from claims against the company by 
exempting them from liability for debts of the company.57 Furthermore, the shareholders have 
limited liability in the sense that if and when a company is liquidated, they only lose their claim 
to the return of their contribution to the share capital.58 Even when the company has incurred 
millions in liabilities, the shareholders cannot be held liable for those liabilities.59 
2.2.2 Piercing of the corporate veil under common law 
As mentioned above, a company has a separate legal existence. There is the potential that this 
separate legal existence may to be abused by shareholders and/or directors,60 thus, the need for 
holding shareholders, directors and officers of the company liable for obligations and activities 
that appear to be those of the company and piercing of the corporate veil in certain 
circumstances.61 This normally occurs when an aggrieved party or creditor suffers harm as a 
result of the abuse of the corporate structure by an insider (shareholder or director) and it is 
suggested that the aggrieved party may apply to court for the corporate veil of the company to be 
pierced in an effort to hold the insider liable for the debt of the company.62 The remedy is based 
on the rule that a corporation should not be formed for the purposes of committing fraud.63 In 
                                                 
53 Salomon (note 3 above). See also Section 14 (1) of the Companies Act 2008. 
54 Salomon (note 3 above). 
55 ibid. 
56 Airport Cold Storage (note 34 above; para 6. 
57 Salomon (note 3 above; 52). 
58 Salomon (note 3 above; 52). 
59 Section 19(2) of the Companies Act 2008. 
60 Amlin (SA) Pty Limited v Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 (C) para 22. 
61 Cape Pacific (note 10 above; 802). 
62 Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. 
63 Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702 712. 
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this respect, the corporate identity of a company will be disregarded when the corporation is used 
as an instrument to commit fraud, to justify wrong or to defend crime.64 Therefore, the remedy 
was developed as a means of addressing injustices resulting from the abuse of the corporate 
identity of the company which is to the detriment of creditors and other third parties.65 
The remedy of piercing the corporate veil allows a disgruntled party to obtain an order from the 
court which will treat the rights and liabilities of the company as those of the shareholders.66 The 
common law remedy allows for the courts to treat the people behind the company, that is, the 
shareholders and/or directors ‘as if they were conducting the business affairs of the company in 
their own personal capacities.’67 However, under common law, courts were reluctant to pierce 
the corporate veil. 
In Dadoo (pty) Limited v Krugersdorp Municipal Council,68 the court held that a company is a 
separate person from its shareholders and the court refused to pierce the corporate veil.69 The 
court in the case of Botha v Van Niekerk70 held that it could not arrive at a finding of personal 
liability (by first respondent) because there was no conviction that the applicant had suffered an 
unconscionable injustice, and that as a consequence of something which, to right-minded 
persons, was clearly improper conduct on the part of first respondent.71 Domanski argues that the 
court in the Botha case could have been justified in piercing the corporate veil to hold the first 
respondent liable for the contractual obligations of the second respondent. The abovementioned 
cases show the reluctance of the courts to pierce the corporate veil under common law. 
In the case of Hulse-Ruetter v Godde,72 an application was initially made in terms of section 424 
of the Companies Act 1973. However, this case involved a foreign company and not a company 
within the meaning of the Companies Act 1973. Therefore, reliance was made on the common 
                                                 
64 Ex parte Gore (note 21 above; para 28). 
65 Airport Cold Storage (note 34 above; para 19). 
66 Atlas Maritime (note 17 above; 779). 
67 Airport Cold Storage (note 34 above; para 20). 
68 Dadoo (note 1 above; 575). 
69 Ibid 574. 
70 Botha (note 31 above). 
71 Botha (note 31 above; 515). 
72 Hulse-Reutter and Others v Gödde 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA). 
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law remedy of piercing the corporate veil.73 The court, in this case, stressed that ‘there must be 
some misuse or abuse of the corporate structure resulting in an unfair advantage being given to 
those who control the corporate entity.’74 The above was stated obiter since the court did not 
pierce the corporate veil because the respondents failed to prove the misuse or abuse of the 
corporate structure.75 The case shows the reluctance of the courts to pierce the corporate veil. 
Sher states that the courts have failed to formulate a single coherent principle on which to base 
decisions made by courts to pierce the corporate veil.76 The courts appear to have relied on a 
number of categories of conduct to justify their decisions.77 Domanski refers to this approach as 
the ‘categorising approach’.78 The dominant categories of conduct included fraud, improper 
conduct, evasion of legal obligations and abuse of the separate legal existence of a company. 
Domanski includes the use of a company by a shareholder as an agent as a category.79 
The remedy has been criticised for being ‘incoherent and unprincipled’ in its application.80 This 
is evident in the application of the remedy in a number of cases. In Orkin Brothers Ltd v Bell81 
the court pierced the corporate veil and held the directors liable for the debts that appeared to be 
those of the company.82 The directors had allowed the company to buy goods on credit, whilst 
                                                 
73 ibid para 5. 
74 ibid para 20. 
75 ibid para 21 and 24. 
76 H Sher, Piercing the Corporate Veil, (1994) 4 Part 2 JBL 51 51 available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jutbusil4&div=22&id=&page= accessed on 15 
August 2014. 
77 A Domanski ‘Piercing The Corporate Veil - A New Direction’ (1986) 103(2) SALJ 224 224 available at 
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=16&men_tab=srchresults&terms=Piercing|The|Corporate|Veil|A|New|Direction%E2%80%99&type=matchall 
accessed on 19 August 2014. 
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accessed on 19 August 2014. 
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http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/soaf103&div=36&collection=journals&set_as_cursor
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accessed on 19 August 2014. 
80 F H Easterbrook and D R Fischel ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ The University of Chicago L R (1985) 
52(1) 89 89 available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1599572 accessed on 28 November 2014. See also Ex parte 
Gore (note 21 above; para 19). 
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they had knowledge that the company would not be able to repay the debt.83 This had amounted 
to fraud.84 Loux J in Lategan v Boyes,85 stated that ‘fraud is the essential requirement for piercing 
the corporate veil and that a fraud committed by the company need always be present before the 
courts can pierce the veil’.86 Blackman commented on this dictum stating that the court in the 
Lategan case had no intention to put down such a strict fraud requirement since there was no 
fraudulent conduct found within the facts.87 One can argue that fraud may be considered by court 
to be improper conduct, but it is not a requirement for piercing the corporate veil. The 
importance of the Lategan case is that it shows how much the courts relied on categories of 
conduct for the purposes of piercing the corporate veil. 
A different test was then applied in Botha v van Niekerk,88 the court held that ‘there could be 
personal liability if it could be proved that the applicant had suffered an ‘unconscionable 
injustice’ as a result of what a reasonable person would identify to be improper conduct on the 
part of the respondent’.89 Domanski states that the decision was harsh on the seller and he goes 
further to highlight that the first respondent failed to comply with the obligations of the contract 
in time and exercised the right to appoint a nominee at a late stage. He submitted that these 
factors show that the first respondent may have had the intention to evade contractual 
obligations. The ‘unconscionable injustice’ test formulated in this case was obiter since the court 
did not pierce the corporate veil based on this test. 
In Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation90 Corbett CJ held that ‘the 
separate personality of the company and the members is of supreme significance and that 
deviation from this rule should only occur in exceptional cases, especially where fraud and 
improper conduct are present’.91 The court in Cape Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments 
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(Pty) Ltd92 stated that ‘the test of ‘unconscionable injustice’ was too rigid and that a more 
flexible test was required, that is, a test that made it necessary for the courts to look at the facts of 
each case’.93 In Hulse-Reutter & Others v Godde94 the court held that there should be improper 
or fraudulent conduct which results in an unfair advantage being afforded to the ones controlling 
the company.95 The above cases applied different tests in deciding whether the corporate veil 
should be pierced and it shows how incoherent and unprincipled the application of the remedy 
was in terms of common law. One can argue that approach in Cape Pacific v Lubner Controlling 
Investments (Pty) Ltd96 allows for flexibility in the application of the remedy and reduces the 
possibility of having the controllers of companies take advantage of loopholes that may be 
created by a rigid test or according to Domanski,97 the categorising approach. 
In relation to the categorising approach, on one hand, Domanski highlighted the flaws of the 
approach since it was described as a means of deciding whether or not to pierce the corporate 
veil.98 Domanski states that there would be facts which require consideration on fairness, public 
policy or equity, but the courts would not be able to categorise the particular issue into one of the 
defined categories.99 Eventually the courts would not be able to pierce the corporate veil causing 
injustice. On the other hand, Gallagher and Zeigler also argue that these categories can be 
summed up into one test, which is, the prevention of injustice which may be caused by the abuse 
of the corporate form of an entity.100 They also commented that, it appears that, the courts are 
willing to pierce the corporate veil where justice would be achieved by doing so.101 It appears 
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that the incoherence still existed despite Gallagher and Zeigler’s effort of summing up the 
categories into a test of the prevention of injustice. It is argued that a much more flexible 
approach was still required and it would be one which takes into account the facts of each case. 
One may support the view of the court in Cape Pacific (Pty) Ltd v Lubner Controlling102 because 
it allows for a flexible approach; one which does not allow for potential wrongdoers to take 
advantage of possible loopholes that may be created by rigid approaches. It may further be 
submitted that if the courts look at the conduct of the wrongdoer, circumstances in which the 
courts may pierce the corporate veil may become wider. The result of the conduct may be the 
one that normally leads to litigation and it may also help to determine unconscionability of the 
conduct of the wrongdoer.103 However, if the courts focus on the result of the conduct only, it 
may not be sufficient to justify application of the remedy. One may argue that both may be 
essential because unconscionable conduct may, in most instances, cause harm to the plaintiff. It 
may further be argued that such an approach has the potential to widen the ambit of 
circumstances in which the court may pierce the corporate veil. One may submit that if such an 
approach is taken, the result would protect the interests of creditors in the end. 
However, some guidelines have been provided in the case of Cape Pacific (Pty) Ltd v Lubner 
Controlling (Pty) Ltd.104 The Appellate Division in this case gave general principles in relation to 
the instances in which the corporate veil can be pierced under common law. The court stated that 
each case should be decided upon its facts105 and the court should consider substance rather than 
form.106 The 'unconscionable injustice' test which was formulated in Botha v Van Niekerk en 'n 
Ander,107 was described by Smalberger JA as perhaps too rigid a test.108 The approach of this 
court to the doctrine of piercing of the corporate veil can be applauded because each case brings 
a different set of facts. One can even agree with court in the Cape Pacific case in relation to the 
test of ‘unconscionable injustice’ which indeed may be rigid since it focuses on the result of the 
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conduct. The conduct may not necessarily result in ‘unconscionable injustice’ and yet the 
conduct itself is unconscionable.109 The requirement of ‘unconscionable abuse’ in terms of 
section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008 will be discussed in the chapter that follows. 
The court in Cape Pacific (Pty) Ltd v Lubner Controlling (Pty) Ltd110 further stated that a court 
has no general discretion simply to pierce the corporate veil whenever it regards it as just to do 
so.111 Smalberger JA stated that fraud, dishonesty or improper conduct could provide grounds for 
piercing the corporate veil.112 The court also emphasised that courts should make efforts to 
uphold a company’s separate legal personality.113 In as much as the court does not have general 
discretion to pierce the corporate veil under common law, it appears to have been the case so far 
that fraud, dishonesty and/or improper conduct have been present in cases where the corporate 
veil has been pierced.114  It should, however, be noted that fraud is not a requirement for courts 
to pierce the corporate veil.115 Furthermore, there was no guideline as to what constitutes 
improper conduct in relation to the application of the common law remedy of piercing the 
corporate veil. This was left to the courts to grapple with. 
The court further stated that if a company is established and operated legitimately, but is later on 
misused in a particular instance to perpetrate a fraud, or for a dishonest or improper purpose, the 
court may pierce the corporate veil in relation to the transaction in question while giving full 
effect to it in other respects.116 The fact that a company was established for a legitimate purpose 
did not and does not preclude the courts from piercing the corporate veil when it is right to pierce 
the corporate veil in the event that the corporate structure of the company is abused.117 
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It was further stated by the court that the corporate veil may be pierced even if another remedy 
exists.118 It should also be noted that the existence of an alternative remedy does not stop one 
from applying for the courts to pierce the corporate veil and that also does not stop courts from 
piercing the corporate veil. If a number of remedies are available, it seems plausible for a 
plaintiff to have the liberty to apply the remedy of their choice. 
According to Cassim, the abovementioned principles can be a useful guide for courts when 
dealing with cases that require the application of the common law remedy.119 Moreover, the 
court in the Cape Pacific case appears to have observed the need for a much more flexible 
approach for the courts to pierce the corporate veil. One can argue in support of Cassim and 
further argue that the abovementioned principles may also work as a guide in the application of 
the new statutory remedy of piercing the corporate veil which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
There is also the need to discuss the application of the ‘sham’ and ‘mere façade’ principle when 
piercing the corporate veil in terms of common law in South Africa. The ‘sham’ principle has not 
really been applied in South Africa. The principle has been discussed in case law and the 
presiding officers have based the discussions mostly on English and Australian authorities. For 
example, in Lategan the Gilford case was used to discuss the sham principle. In the Cape Pacific 
case, the first and second respondents were held not to be the sham, mask or alter ego of Lubner. 
Nevertheless, in Exparte Gore, Binns-Ward J stated in obiter that the evidence of the King 
Brothers’ disregard of the separate legal existence of the companies in King Group could have 
led the court to conclude that the group was actually a sham.120 In the South African jurisdiction, 
the sham principle seems to be described as mere disregard of the separate legal existence of a 
company by the controllers. The principle can be discussed further based on the English case of 
Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd.121 
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The English court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd,122 differentiated between a ‘mere façade’ 
and ‘sham’ in terms of common law with regards to piercing of the corporate veil.123  It was 
stated that while the word ‘façade’ connotes concealment, ‘sham’ connotes evasion.124 The court 
held that concealment is when a company is incorporated with the intention to hide the identity 
of the person who is actually conducting business.125 On the other hand, evasion was held to be a 
circumstance where a company is incorporated with the intention to prevent the enforcement of a 
legal right against the controller of the company.126 
The majority of the court, in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd,127 stated obiter that concealment 
does not call for the application of the remedy of piercing of the corporate veil.128 The courts in 
this jurisdiction would only be looking behind the company to reveal the identity of the one 
actually conducting business or the facts which the corporate structure is concealing.129 
Mandaraka-Sheppard states that Staughton LJ equated the exercise of discovering what is 
concealed behind the veil with ‘lifting the corporate veil to peep behind it’.130 However, it 
appears that the distinction between piercing and lifting of the corporate veil seems unnecessary 
since it comes to the same result of rendering the wrongdoer personally liable. If the matter was 
held in a South African court, both evasion and concealment may have warranted the piercing of 
the corporate veil since it brings out the same result which is holding the wrongdoer personally 
liable. 
On the other hand, the majority of the court in Prest131 stated obiter that the remedy is applicable 
to cases where there is evasion.132 In relation to the evasion principle, Heintzman and Kain state 
that parties should not profit from their misconduct and courts should interpret statute so as to 
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suppress mischief.133 However, it seems as though the approach of piercing the corporate veil in 
instances of evasion and not instances of concealment restricts the operation of the remedy to 
limited circumstances. It may further be submitted that the approach may be inflexible and may 
not be sufficient to address the issue of the abuse of the corporate personality of companies. One 
may argue in support of Lady Hale when she stated that: 
‘…what the cases (concealment and evasion) do have in common is that the separate 
legal personality is being disregarded in order to obtain a remedy against someone other 
than the company in respect of a liability which would otherwise be that of the company 
alone’. 
There is, therefore, no need to distinguish between lifting and piercing because it brings the same 
result even if it is a case of concealment or evasion. 
The Australian courts may pierce the corporate veil when a company is used as a ‘sham or mere 
façade’.134 The corporate veil has also been pierced in cases where the corporate form is used as 
a ‘sham’.135 However, the corporate veil would not be pierced because of an unfair result that 
may occur from separate legal personality.136 The South African court in Cape Pacific (Pty) Ltd 
v Lubner Controlling (Pty) Ltd137 seems to have supported the notion that the corporate veil 
would not be pierced because of an unfair result that occurs from the abuse of the corporate form 
since the court rejected the ‘unconscionable injustice’ test the was applied in the case of Botha v 
van Niekerk.138 It was held to be too rigid.139Although there are guidelines from the Cape Pacific 
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case, the remedy under common law is regarded as an exceptional procedure, and a remedy of 
last resort.140 There is a need to provide compelling reasons for the court to pierce the corporate 
veil under common law.141 The need to provide compelling reasons may be seen to be necessary 
because it may work as a measure to avoid having frivolous actions brought before the courts. 
However, one may argue that such a requirement may give the plaintiff a heavy burden of proof 
when attempting to obtain an order to pierce the corporate veil. 
From the above discussion it has been established that the courts were more reluctant to pierce 
the corporate veil under common law. The application of the remedy was criticised for being 
incoherent and unprincipled. It has also been established that the tests propounded in Lategan 
and in Botha were both obiter since the corporate veil was not pierced in both cases. That means 
the tests are not binding and do not add much value to the application of the remedy. The 
Lategan case is of importance because it shows the meagreness of the categorising approach and 
most of the cases highlighted above show the inconsistency of the courts in the application of the 
common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil. 
The common law remedy has been discussed highlighting the application of the remedy in 
foreign jurisdictions. The reason for this comparison is to determine whether it is possible to 
derive guidelines as to the approach to be taken when the remedy of the piercing of the corporate 
veil is applied for by the applicant. The guidelines may assist courts in the application of the 
remedy of piercing the corporate veil and also in reaching a judgement especially in cases where 
the new statutory remedy is applied. Recommendations may be moulded around the approaches 
of these foreign jurisdictions. 
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2.2.3  Piercing of the corporate veil under the Companies Act 1973 in South Africa 
The Companies Act of 1973 contained provisions that allowed courts to hold the controllers 
personally liable for debts of the company in certain circumstances.142 Being held personally 
liable for loss, costs or damages incurred by the company was a form of piercing of the corporate 
veil under the Companies Act 1973.143 Some of these provisions include section 50(3),144 section 
66,145 section 172(5)b,146 section 280(5),147 section 344(h)148 and section 424(1).149 However, for 
the purposes of this dissertation section 424(1) will be discussed because the provision is 
couched in such a way that it prevents those in control of a company from using its corporate 
identity to incur obligations in a reckless, grossly negligent or fraudulent manner whilst 
benefiting from immunity from liability for debts. This is more or less the same case with 
piercing of the corporate veil under common law, save for the fact that the provision is limited to 
fraud and reckless management of a company’s affairs. 
Creditors and other plaintiffs relied on section 424 to hold shareholders and/or directors 
personally liable, especially in cases where the creditor did not have a cause of action against the 
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shareholder(s) or directors due to the operation of the separate legal personality principle derived 
from the Salomon case.150 Section 424 provides as follows: 
‘the Court may declare that any person who knowingly took part in the carrying on of the 
business of the company recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of the company or 
creditors of any other person or for any fraudulent purpose personally responsible for the 
debts or other liabilities of the company’.151 
According to Henochsberg, the provision empowers the court to declare a respondent personally 
liable for debts and liabilities of the company.152 Section 424(1) applies when mismanagement of 
the company affairs goes beyond incompetence and becomes gross or dishonest.153 When there is 
proof of such gross and dishonest handling of the company’s affairs, the courts would disregard 
the separate legal existence of the company.154 
Section 424 of the Companies Act 1973 was not limited to directors of the company but applied 
to “any person”, including a shareholder of the company, provided that the shareholder was 
knowingly a party to the reckless or fraudulent activity.155 The word ‘knowingly’ was discussed 
in the case of Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman and Others.156 The court stated that: 
“the word “knowingly” means having knowledge of the facts from which the conclusion 
is properly to be drawn that the business of the company was or is being carried on 
recklessly; it does not entail knowledge of the legal consequences of those facts. It 
follows that `knowingly’ does not necessarily mean consciousness of recklessness. Being 
a party to the conduct of the company’s business does not have to involve the taking of 
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positive steps in the carrying on of the business; it may be enough to support or concur in 
the conduct of the business.”157 
The provision seems to be broad in respect to the persons that can be held personally liable for 
the debts of the company. It, therefore, goes beyond directors and shareholders because it applies 
when ‘any person’ who knowingly took part in the reckless or fraudulent activity of the 
company. An example of an outsider who may be held personally liable for the debts of the 
company may be that of one who participates in insider trading which may cause both the 
company and other creditors to suffer loss. However, the usefulness of such a broad approach 
may be difficult to fuse into the new statutory remedy since it would deal specifically with the 
prevention of insiders from abusing the corporate form of a company. 
The requirement of ‘recklessness’ was also considered in this case as implying something more 
than mere negligence, at the very least, gross negligence.158 An example of recklessness is found 
in Ozinsky NO v Lloyd159 where Van Deventer J stated that “If a company continues to carry on 
business and to incur debts when, in the opinion of reasonable businessmen, standing in the 
shoes of the directors, there would be no reasonable prospect of the creditors receiving payment 
when due, it will in general be a proper inference that the business is being carried on 
recklessly”.160 In Fourie v Newton161 the Court stated that ‘[a]cting ‘recklessly’ consists in ‘an 
entire failure to give consideration to the consequences of one’s actions, in other words, an 
attitude of reckless disregard of such consequences’.162  
It appears the reasonable man test is used to determine whether one acted recklessly in terms of 
s424 of the Companies Act1973. In Fourie v Newton163 the Court stated that  
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“[t]he test for recklessness has both objective and subjective elements. It is objective, to 
the extent that the defendant's actions are measured against the standard of conduct of a 
notional reasonable person. The test is subjective, to the extent that it must be postulated 
that the notional person belongs to the same group or class as the defendant, moving in 
the same sphere and having the same knowledge or means of knowledge. In the context 
of s 424, the court should have regard, amongst other things, to the scope of operations of 
the company, the role, functions and powers of the directors, the amount of the debts, the 
extent of the company’s financial difficulties and the prospects, if any, of recovery”.164  
The reasonable man test appears to be useful in determining whether one was reckless and this 
reasonable man test may be useful in determining whether there is ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the 
corporate form of a company when there is the application of section 20(9) of the Companies Act 
of 2008. 
There seems to have been an improvement from the common law remedy, especially in cases 
involving fraud and recklessness in that there was some certainty in the application of s424 of the 
Companies Act of 1973 than in piercing of the corporate veil in terms of common law. If 
common law was to apply in a case where there was recklessness, other conventional remedies 
would have been used. An example of such a remedy is payment of damages and compensation 
by the defendant, which may not necessarily restore the aggrieved party to their original position.  
Despite the existence of these provisions and their successful use in certain cases,165 section 424 
deals specifically with fraudulent and reckless conducting of business. If the court was faced 
with a case where there is mere disregard of the separate legal existence of a company without 
the involvement of fraud or recklessness, the provision could possibly have not applied and the 
court would have had to rely on common law which was still incoherent and unprincipled in its 
application. Since the provision was limited to recklessness and fraud, it seems there was still the 
need for a more generalised remedy which would allow courts to pierce the corporate veil when 
the circumstances justified it. There was need for a more generalised remedy which was not 
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specific to fraud or recklessness, but one which addressed the issue of the abuse of the separate 
legal existence of a company. It is possible that in a case where there is recklessness and s 20(9) 
of the Companies Act of 2008 applies, the reasonable man test may apply to assist the courts in 
coming to a decision to pierce the corporate veil. 
It should be noted that the Companies Act of 2008 repealed and replaced the Companies Act 61 
of 1973.166 However, section 424(1) of the Companies Act 1973 still applies to the winding- up 
and liquidation of companies unless it is in conflict with a provision(s) of the Companies Act of 
2008.167 When there is such a conflict between provisions of the previous Companies Act168 and 
the current Companies Act169, the provisions of the current Companies Act will prevail.170 The 
new statutory remedy will be discussed in the chapter that follows.  
2.2.4 Piercing of the corporate veil under the Close Corporations Act 1984 
At common law, ‘piercing the corporate veil is regarded as a drastic remedy that must be 
resorted to sparingly and as a last resort in circumstances where justice will not otherwise be 
done’.171 In 1984 the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil was codified with 
respect to close corporations. The remedy is contained in section 65 of the Close Corporations 
Act of 1984 which provides that: 
‘Whenever a Court on application by an interested person, or in any proceedings in which 
a corporation is involved, finds that the incorporation of, or any act by or on behalf of, or 
any use of, that corporation, constitutes a gross abuse of the juristic personality of the 
corporation as a separate entity, the Court may declare that the corporation is to be 
deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of such rights, obligations or liabilities of the  
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corporation, or of such member or members thereof, or of such other person or persons,  
as are specified in the declaration, and the Court  may give such further order or orders as  
it may deem fit in order to give effect to such declaration.’172 
The statutory remedy, unlike the common law remedy, gives courts the discretion to pierce the 
corporate veil.173 The courts could pierce the corporate veil of a close corporation if the court 
finds upon the facts that there was ‘gross abuse’ of the separate legal existence of the close 
corporation.174 However, as per Henochsberg’s observation, the section did not describe the 
circumstances or facts that constitute ‘gross abuse’.175 The legislature left it to the courts to 
determine on the facts of each case what would constitute ‘gross abuse’.176 
According to the Farlex dictionary the word ‘gross’ means flagrant and extreme.177 It also means 
extremely objectionable, offensive, crude or shocking behaviour.178 The word ‘abuse’ means to 
use improperly or to excessively misuse.179 It is an unjust or wrongful or corrupt practice.180 It 
may also be a deception.181 The thesaurus states that abuse can be a change of the inherent 
purpose or function of something.182 It can be deduced that ‘gross abuse’ is conduct or behaviour 
which is wrongful and extremely objectionable; giving rise to the application of section 65 of the 
Close Corporations Act of 1984. This may be conduct which is improper, crude, corrupt and/or 
offensive.183 
In terms of s 65 of the Close Corporations Act, the corporate veil may be pierced only in 
instances where there is ‘gross abuse’ of the juristic personality of the close corporation. The 
term gross abuse was not explained in the statutory provision. The courts had to grapple with the 
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meaning or what constituted gross abuse. The meaning of gross abuse will be discussed with 
reference to conduct which the court concluded to be gross abuse. 
 In the case of Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe,184 the applicants were meat suppliers to 
the CC (Mr Meat Man, hereafter referred to as the third respondent).185 The third respondent was 
trading without revealing its real name or pointing out the fact that it was close corporation.186 
The members of the close corporation and the close corporation itself were held jointly and 
severally liable for the debts of the close corporation in terms of section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act.187 The court concluded that it was justified in making an order in terms of 
section 65 of the Close Corporations Act because the failure to provide the name of the close 
corporation on the business premises or stationery constituted ‘gross abuse’ of the corporate 
structure.188 
In TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis NO,189 the member of the close 
corporation was held personally liable for the debts of the close corporation in terms of section 
64 of the Close Corporations Act. The close corporation had conducted its business under 
insolvent circumstances and the member of the close corporation knowingly took part in carrying 
on business in these circumstances.190 The member had granted the corporation a loan and 
authorised for a notarial bond to be registered over the movable property of the corporation as 
security for the loan.191 He did this with the knowledge that the corporation was insolvent.192 The 
court concluded that the member had ‘conducted his affairs in such a manner that he would 
easily take over the movable assets if the corporation encountered difficulties; which he took 
over eventually’.193 The court held the member personally liable for the debts of the corporation. 
It was further held that ‘the plaintiff could have also succeeded in terms of section 65 of the 
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Close Corporations Act because the conduct of the member constituted ‘gross abuse’ of the 
corporate structure.194 
According to the court in TJ Jonck,195 the facts before it constituted ‘gross abuse’ and it appears 
that this was a development from the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil. In this 
respect, writers like Larkin were of the view that in TJ Jonck196 the corporate veil was pierced 
when the court could have brought the same result through another route.197 Such a view could 
have been derived from the common law approach to piercing where the courts were reluctant to 
pierce the corporate veil. However, the approach in the case of Cape Pacific198 is praiseworthy, 
where the court stated that one should be free to use the remedy of their choice.199 It can be 
argued that one should be free to choose the remedy that works to their best advantage to give 
them the best possible result. 
Section 65 of the Close Corporations Act 1984 was also relied on in the case of Airport Cold 
Storage (Pty) v Ebrahim.200 The provision gave the courts discretion to disregard the juristic 
personality of a corporation when that particular entity was misused by its members.201 Facts of 
the case are provided for the purposes of bringing awareness to creditors of the examples of 
improper conduct or conduct that may constitute ‘gross abuse’ leading the courts to pierce the 
corporate veil. The creditors in this case had proven a claim against the corporation for the 
outstanding amount of R278 377 but received no payment because the corporation had no 
assets.202 The creditors then sought to hold the members of the corporation accountable.203 The 
defendants had not kept any proper accounting records204 and they had no accounting officer.205 
                                                 
194 ibid. 
195 TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis NO 1998 1 SA 971 (O). 
196 ibid. 
197 M P Larkin ‘Company Law (including Close Corporations)’ 1998 Ann Surv S African L available at 
http://www.heinonline.org.ezproxy.ukzn.ac.za:2048/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/assafl1998&div=27&collecti
on=journals&set_as_cursor=9&men_tab=srchresults&terms=SECTION|65|OF|THE|CLOSE|C|P|ATIONS|ACT|O
F|1984&type=matchall accessed on 25 July 2015. 
198 Cape Pacific (note 10 above). 
199 Cape Pacific (note 10 above; 805). 
200 Airport Cold Storage (note 34 above). 
201 ibid para 15. 
202 ibid para 1. 
203 ibid para 2. 
204 ibid para 49. 
28 
 
They also ran the business in an informal manner in the sense that although they had a bank 
account they operated on a cash basis.206 It was alleged and proved that the business was started 
by the defendants for a fraudulent reason, that is, to avoid liquidation of their other business 
(Zaki Meat Market CC).207 
In granting the order, the court held that ‘[it] has power to pierce the corporate veil in 
extraordinary circumstances,208 for example, if the corporation is used to conceal the true facts of 
how that particular entity is being run by its members.’209 The court concluded that the members 
of the corporation had not used the corporation as an independent entity and the corporate veil 
was pierced.210 The veil of incorporation was pierced because the defendants chose to disregard 
the separate juristic personality of the corporation211 and the court held that they cannot hide 
behind its corporate identity in an effort to avoid liability for its debts.212 The defendants had not 
complied with legislative requirements for running the close corporation.213 One may argue that 
the courts are justified when they pierce the corporate veil in circumstances where a company is 
formed and used for fraudulent purposes because this has the potential effect of protecting the 
interests of creditors and other interested parties like investors. 
The cases explored above show that the courts had the discretion to pierce the corporate veil in 
terms of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act of 1984. The courts could only pierce the 
corporate veil of a close corporation where there was evidence of gross abuse of the separate 
juristic personality of the entity.214 However, courts would still not lightly disregard the separate 
legal existence of a company under the Close Corporations Act.215 They remain reluctant to 
pierce the corporate veil probably to avoid discouraging businessmen from making investments. 
It may be submitted that if the corporate veil is pierced often and with ease, then the concept of 
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the separate legal personality of a juristic person may become obsolete. Nevertheless, if the 
separate legal personality of a company is unconscionably disregarded by the members of a close 
corporation, this is an argument for suggesting that the courts would be justified in piercing the 
corporate veil. 
It is noteworthy to highlight that even when the requirements for section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act are not met; the common law remedy can apply to close corporations. It, 
therefore, appears that there was not much of an improvement from the common law remedy of 
piercing the corporate veil because the courts remained reluctant to pierce the veil of the close 
corporations. The development that came was brought in the form a test which was to be used by 
courts to pierce the corporate veil of close corporations and this test was that of conduct which 
constituted ‘gross abuse’ allowing courts to pierce the veil when it is found within the facts of 
the case before the court. However, the courts still had the burden of determining what 
constituted ‘gross abuse’, which is more or less similar to the burden it had of determining what 
constituted ‘improper conduct’ in relation to the common law remedy of piercing the corporate 
veil. 
Furthermore, in relation to companies, there was no equivalent statutory remedy to pierce the 
corporate veil and it appears there was still a need for a remedy which was much more clear and 
certain than the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil. The remedy provided by the 
Companies Act of 2008 will be discussed in the chapter that follows. It is submitted that the 
circumstances in which the corporate veil was pierced in terms of section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act of 1984 may serve as a guideline in the application of section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act of 2008. A comparison will be made between gross abuse and unconscionable 
abuse when the issue of unconscionable abuse is considered in the context of section 20(9) of the 




In summary, the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil has been developed and 
integrated into the corporate laws of South Africa. As discussed above, in terms of common law, 
the remedy of piercing the corporate veil appears to be ‘unprincipled and incoherent’ in its 
application.  Initially with respect to companies, the Companies Act of 1973 contained 
provisions that allowed courts to hold the controllers personally liable for loss, costs or damages 
incurred by the company as a result of the improper conduct of shareholders and/or directors. 
Section 424(1) was discussed because it prevents the abuse of the corporate form of a company 
by those who control it. The first statutory remedy which gave courts general discretion to pierce 
the corporate veil was section 65 of the Close Corporations Act of 1984. The test for piercing the 
corporate veil in terms of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act of 1984 is ‘gross abuse’ of 
the separate legal existence of the close corporation.  
It has been established that the courts were more reluctant to pierce the corporate veil under 
common law. The application of the remedy was criticised for being incoherent and 
unprincipled. It has also been established that in terms of section 424(1) there has been 
development from the common law remedy in that there is the application of the reasonable man 
test to determine whether one was reckless or not. However, there was still the need for a more 
generalised remedy because section 424(1) was limited to fraud and recklessness. In terms of 
section 65 of the Close Corporations Act of 1984, development was brought in the form a test of 
‘gross abuse’ allowing courts to pierce the veil when it is found within the facts of the case 
before the court that the corporate form of a close corporation has been grossly abused. 
However, the courts still had the burden of determining what constituted ‘gross abuse’, which is 
the same burden it had of determining what constituted ‘improper conduct’ in relation to the 
common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil.  
With respect to companies, there was no statutory remedy of piercing of the corporate veil and 
the common law remedy applied. Since the common law remedy of piercing of the corporate veil 
appears to be ‘incoherent and unprincipled’ in its application, there was the need to have a 
statutory remedy that applies to companies. There was need for a more generalised remedy 
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which would address the issue of the abuse of the separate legal existence of a company.  A 
remedy that gives the courts general discretion to pierce the corporate veil and the statutory 













CHAPTER 3: PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL UNDER SECTION 
20(9) OF THE COMPANIES ACT OF 2008 
3.1 Introduction 
The remedy of piecing the corporate veil was codified in respect of companies in 2008 when the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 was enacted.216 Codification may have been necessary because there 
was the need for certainty since under common law the remedy is unprincipled and it is 
unpredictable.217 There is also the possibility that the legislature codified the remedy to bring the 
application of the concept of unconscionability to counter the abuse of the corporate structure.218 
The legislature may have also intended to give further protection to the weak against the strong 
because the concept of unconscionability is used as a defence against unjust, unfair and 
unreasonable conduct by controllers of companies.219 If the abuse of companies as separate legal 
entities goes unaddressed, creditors may suffer harm and that may defeat the purpose of the 
Companies Act 2008.220  In this section the concepts of unconscionability and the piercing of the 
corporate veil have been connected by setting unconscionability as the standard for determining 
when the remedy of piercing the corporate veil is available. 
This chapter will consider the statutory provision first, how it may be interpreted and then an 
evaluation of the provision will be made. The meaning of section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 
2008 will also be discussed. A discussion of the difference in the wording of section 65 of the 
Close Corporations Act of 1984 and section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008 will be included 
in this chapter. The chapter will include a discussion of the meaning of ‘unconscionable abuse’ 
and in particular what may be considered by court as constituting ‘unconscionable abuse’. 
Critical comments will be made on the term ‘unconscionable abuse’. There will also be an 
evaluation of whether section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008 overrides the common law 
instances of piercing the corporate veil. 
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3.2 Section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008 in general 
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act provides that: 
‘the court may on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which a 
company is involved, a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any use of the 
company, or any act by or on behalf of the company, constitutes an ‘unconscionable 
abuse’ of the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity.”221 
There are different theories of interpretation applied within the laws of South Africa. It appears 
the statutory provision needs to be interpreted using a purposive approach and such an approach 
was taken by Binns-Ward J in Exparte Gore,222the first case where this provision was applied. 
The purposive approach focuses on the purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.223 
Furthermore, it should be noted that statutes must be interpreted giving regard to the 
Constitution.224 Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that ‘When interpreting any 
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or 
forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. This shows that the 
Constitution mandates a purposive and value based approach when one interprets legislation.225 
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 must be interpreted taking section 7 and section 5 of 
the Companies Act of 2008 into account.226 Section 7 deals with the purpose of the Companies 
Act of 2008 and it appears that the purposive approach may be plausible in interpreting section 
20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008. Thus, section 20(9) has to be interpreted giving effect to 
purposes set out in section 7. One of the purposes which may need to be given effect whilst 
interpreting section 20(9) include encouraging the responsible management of companies, 
having transparency and high standards of corporate governance. 
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The purposive approach may not work alone; it may have to work hand in glove with the 
contextual approach. With regards to the contextual approach, the one interpreting has to put the 
meaning of the words used in the statute into context. When looking at the context of the statute, 
the language of the entire statute, the purpose and the background of the statute have to be 
looked at. Binns-Ward J seems to have taken the contextual approach also because he looked at 
whether the statutory provision had replaced the common law provision. This stems from the 
background of the statutory provision whereby it appears to have come in place to address the 
inadequacies of the common law provision for piercing the corporate veil. These include the lack 
of clear principles to be followed when piercing the corporate veil which led to inconsistency, 
uncertainty and unpredictability which was highlighted above.227 It may be argued that the 
purpose of the statutory provision was to bring a clear test for piercing the corporate veil and that 
the legislature’s intention was to bring consistency and certainty to the remedy of piercing the 
corporate veil. 
The meaning of section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 may also be deduced from this rule. 
Section 5 deals with the general interpretation of the Act and section 7 deals with the purpose of 
the Act. The corporate law reform process seems to have emphasised the need for simplification, 
flexibility, corporate efficiency, transparency and predictable regulation. These are the values 
encapsulated in section 7 of the Companies Act of 2008. This is the reason why certain 
provisions within section 7 in particular can be of assistance in determining what may constitute 
‘unconscionable abuse’.  
Section 7(k) provides that ‘the purposes of this Act are to… provide for the efficient rescue and 
recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner that balances the rights and interests of 
all relevant stakeholders (creditors)228…’229 The Act does not define the concept of 
“stakeholders” in section 7 (k).230 Henochsberg submits that the ordinary meaning would also 
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include the meaning as found in King III,231 where it is defined as “[a]ny group affected by and 
affecting the company’s operations”.232 One can argue that the words ‘any group affected 
by…the company’s operations’, may include creditors who may be affected by the operations by 
the company, especially when such operations result in the abuse of the separate legal 
personality of the company.233 
Section 7(d) provides that directors have to manage a company in a way that promotes both 
economic and social benefits. Section 7(d) should also be construed to mean that directors must 
take note of the interests of stakeholders (creditors), but that stakeholders are not provided with 
direct rights. Henochsberg submits that the Act strives to create a balance between creating a 
flexible business environment and regulation that holds the company and its office bearers liable 
to the stakeholders (creditors) of the company.234 As it appears, section 7 of the Companies Act 
is in favour of piercing the veil where the corporate structure of a company has been abused.235 
Section 20(9) gives courts discretion to pierce the corporate veil where it finds that there has 
been the ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality of a company.236 A request for an 
order by court to have the corporate veil pierced may be brought by way of application.237 
However, the court can act on its own initiative where there is ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the 
separate legal personality of a company.238 The use of the word ‘may’ is the one which indicates 
that courts have discretion whether to pierce the corporate veil. This means that even if the 
requirements of section 20(9) are met, a court is not obliged to pierce the corporate veil, but has 
discretion whether to do so. However, the courts are not given a general discretion to pierce the 
corporate veil when they think it is fair to do so, but they only have that discretion if there is 
evidence of ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality of a company as a separate legal 
entity. 
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It is important to note that the statutory remedy did not ‘substitute the common law remedy as 
stated by the court in Ex parte Gore.239 Unlike section 165(1) of the Companies Act 2008 which 
deals with derivative actions,240 the statutory provision does not expressly state that the common 
law remedy of piercing the corporate veil has been abolished and substituted by statute. It 
appears that the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil was not replaced because 
there may be instances, like the one in the case of Hulse Ruetter v Godde,241 where the statutory 
remedy does not apply and yet common law would be appropriate. One may submit that 
common law may have not been replaced by the legislature because it has not been found to be 
unconstitutional since it has to be applied giving regard to the Constitution. 
Cassim submits that the possible reason for that is the fact that the common law remedy may still 
apply in cases where section 20(9) requirements are not met.242 One may argue, in support of 
Cassim, that this may have the effect of affording creditors additional protection to their interests 
in the sense that when section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 does not apply; the common law 
remedy may apply. Furthermore, Cassim submits that when interpreting section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act of 2008 the principles established at common law may be used as guidelines by 
courts to determine what may constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’.243 
According to Binns-ward J, ‘[T]he language of section 20(9) is cast in very wide terms and it 
indicates the intention of the legislature that the provision finds application in widely varying 
factual circumstances.’244 This is reinforced by the fact that a court may also pierce the corporate 
veil of a company even where the applicant in the matter before it has not requested the court to 
do so.245 One may argue that applicants are now being afforded better protection by the law 
because the remedy applies in widely varying instances where the corporate form is abused. It 
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appears that the protection bought by the legislature involves courts stepping in when an 
aggrieved party has not requested for the piercing of the corporate veil. 
Section 20 (9) refers to ‘incorporation of the company, use of the company or act by or on behalf 
of the company’. This means that the application of the statutory remedy does not start and end 
with the formation of the company as ‘a sham or device or stratagem’.246 In Ex parte Gore,247 the 
court stated that: 
‘the words ‘unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of a company’ used in s20(9) 
postulate conduct in relation to the formation and  use of companies that is diverse 
enough to cover all the descriptive terms such as ‘sham’, ‘device’, ‘stratagem’, and 
conceivably much more’.248  
The meaning of the statutory remedy, in particular, the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ will be 
discussed further below. 
3.3 Meaning of ‘unconscionable abuse’ in general 
The statutory remedy allows for courts to pierce the corporate veil of a company where there is 
evidence of the ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality of the company. However, 
section 20(9) did not give the meaning of ‘unconscionable abuse’, nor did it state or give a 
guideline as to what constitutes ‘unconscionable abuse’. In South Africa the term 
‘unconscionable’ was used and defined in the Consumer Protection Act of 2009.249 The word 
‘unconscionable’ is described as ‘unethical or improper to a degree that would shock the 
conscience of a reasonable person’.250 In this section the concepts of unconscionability and the 
piercing of the corporate veil have been connected by setting unconscionability as the standard 
for determining when the remedy of piercing the corporate veil is available. 
                                                 
246 Ex parte Gore (note 21 above; para 34). 
247 Ex parte Gore (note 21 above). 
248 ibid para 34. 
249 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2009. 
250 Advanced English Dictionary by Princeton University. 
38 
 
The word ‘unconscionable’ is generally related to actions, behaviour and conduct. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines the word as ‘[actions, behaviour, etc.] showing no regard for 
conscience or not in accordance with what is right or reasonable.’ The thesaurus of the Free 
Dictionary by Farlex defines unconscionable as ‘greatly exceeding the bounds of reason or 
moderation’. The phrase ‘unconscionable abuse’ suggests a form of abuse that gives rise to the 
application of statutory the remedy.251 It may be deduced, from the Thesaurus meaning of the 
word ‘unconscionable’, that the words ‘unconscionable abuse’ may mean that the conduct giving 
rise to the application of the remedy is conduct which is unethical and indefensible.252 
The term ‘unconscionable’ is not new in the context of the piercing remedy. The term 
‘unconscionable’ has also been considered in case law in the context of piercing under common 
law. The court in the Botha v Van Niekerk253 case stated that it would pierce the corporate veil if 
the plaintiff has suffered ‘unconscionable injustice’ as a result of the inappropriate conduct of the 
defendant.254 However, the court in Cape Pacific (Pty) Ltd v Lubner Controlling255 stated that 
‘there is a need for a more flexible approach which allows the facts of each case to ultimately 
determine whether the courts should pierce the corporate veil’ because test formulated in Botha v 
Van Niekerk en 'n Ander256 is perhaps too rigid.257 It appears that the reasonable man test played 
a part in determining whether or not to pierce the corporate veil in terms of common law. The 
reasonable man test may still play a part in determining what constitutes unconscionable abuse. 
The court may use a fictional character as to what a reasonable man would have done to 
determine whether the wrongdoer acted reasonably given the circumstances. Therefore, the 
reasonable man test may remain relevant in the context of section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 
2008 so as to determine what may constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’. 
Currently, in terms of the Companies Act of 2008 the general test used to decide when the 
corporate veil may be pierced is ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality of a company 
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as a separate legal entity. The court would look at the conduct of the wrongdoer to determine 
whether such conduct constitutes ‘unconscionable abuse’. If the conduct constitutes 
‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality of a company as a separate legal entity, the 
court may exercise its discretion and pierce the corporate veil. This has the effect of rendering 
the wrongdoer personally liable for the debt that arose due to the ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the 
company. 
Under the Close Corporations Act of 1984 the test for piercing the corporate veil is ‘gross abuse’ 
and it allows the court to disregard the separate legal existence of a close corporation. Courts 
would use the balancing approach when deciding whether to pierce or not to pierce the corporate 
veil.258 This approach requires the court to weigh the separate legal personality against the 
principles that favoured the piercing of the corporate veil.259 The wording in section 65 of the 
Close Corporations Act of 1984 and section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008 is almost 
similar. Neither Act replaces the common law remedy, but they are supplemental to it.260 
However, there is a difference between the two provisions and it is important to look into the 
intention behind using the different wording. The Close Corporations Act uses the words ‘gross 
abuse’ and the Companies Act uses the words ‘unconscionable abuse’. 
The term ‘unconscionable abuse’, according to the court in Exparte Gore,261 is less extreme as 
compared to the term ‘gross abuse’ used in the Close Corporations Act of 1984.262 The court 
stated that this indicates that ‘the remedy may be used whenever the illegitimate use of the 
concept of juristic personality adversely affects a third party in a way that should not be 
tolerated’ and such illegitimate use should constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’.263 In terms of 
section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008, there is no requirement for the abuse to result in 
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affording an unfair advantage to those controlling the company.264 This is unlike what was stated 
by the court in the case of Hulse-Reutter & Others v Godde,265 a case which dealt with the 
piercing of the corporate veil in terms of common law. This may therefore mean that the 
legislature intended to bring flexibility in the application of the remedy.266 
Unlike South Africa, which now has a statutory remedy, there is no general test for deciding 
when to pierce the corporate veil in the English267 and the Australian jurisdictions.268 The 
absence of a general test can be attributed to the fact that the courts have regularly relied on 
certain established categories, such as fraud, agency, evasion of legal obligations and abuse of 
the corporate structure to decide whether the corporate veil in a particular case should be 
pierced.269 It appears that such categories may work as a guide in determining what may 
constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’, but circumstance which may constitute ‘unconscionable 
abuse’ are not limited to the categories.  
In as much as categorisation may make application of the remedy of piercing of the corporate 
veil rigid, it may be argued that fraud and evasion of legal obligations may be circumstances 
where the corporate veil may have been pierced often.270 These two circumstances seem to have 
been proven as constituting ‘unconscionable abuse’ in the cases where a company is used to 
commit fraud, but ‘unconscionable abuse’ is not limited to fraud.271 The courts would still have 
to decide each case upon its merits and allow for the remedy to apply when the circumstances 
justify it. Such an approach would keep the application of the remedy flexible. 
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Noteworthy is the fact that Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 applies even when another 
remedy exists. As long as the separate juristic personality of a company has been unconscionably 
abused, the corporate veil may be pierced. In this regard, reference can be made to the case of 
Cape Pacific v Lubner272 where the court stated that; 
‘In principle, there is no reason why piercing of the corporate veil should necessarily be 
precluded if another remedy exists. As a general rule, if a person has more than one legal remedy 
at his disposal, he can select any one of them; he is not obliged to pursue one rather than the other 
(although there may be instances where once he has made an election he will be bound by it). If 
the facts of a particular case otherwise justify piercing the veil, the existence of another remedy, 
or the failure to pursue what would have been an available remedy, should not in principle serve 
as an absolute bar to a court granting consequential relief. The existence of another remedy, or the 
failure to pursue one that was available, may be a relevant factor when policy considerations 
come into play, but it cannot be of overriding importance.’273 
Unlike the common law remedy of piercing of the corporate veil,274 despite the existence of 
another remedy, one should be at liberty to use the remedy of their choice and section 20(9) of 
the Companies Act of 2008 seems to allow for an aggrieved party to apply to the courts for 
piercing of the corporate veil even if another remedy exists to remedy the wrong.275 
Having deliberated on the meaning of ‘unconscionable abuse’, one can agree with the court in 
the case of Ex parte Gore,276 where it was held that the words ‘unconscionable abuse’ have a 
‘less extreme connotation than the words ‘gross abuse’ found in section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act 1984. This may mean that certain conduct which was not considered to be 
‘gross abuse’ may be considered by courts as ‘unconscionable abuse’. This widens the scope of 
the application of the remedy whilst giving further protection to the weak against the strong.  
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The new remedy seems to have widened the basis for piercing of the corporate veil. For the 
statutory remedy to apply there must be some form of ‘unconscionable abuse’ and factors 
considered by the courts for its application have been discussed above. Section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act of 2008 seems to be flexible since courts still decide each case upon its facts. 
There is also, unqualified availability of the remedy, unlike common law remedy which applies 
in extraordinary circumstances and does not apply where an alternative remedy is available. 
It has been established that the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ relates to conduct giving rise to the 
application of the remedy and such conduct is unethical and indefensible. It has also been 
established that the terms ‘unconscionable abuse’ is different from the term ‘gross abuse’ which 
was used in section 65 of the Close Corporations Act of 1984. The chapter also established that 
the test of ‘unconscionable injustice used in the Botha case discussed above was a rigid and a 
more flexible test was necessary, that is, ‘unconscionable abuse’. It was also established that 
each case has to be determined upon its facts. If the courts find the conduct of the wrongdoer to 
constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’, the corporate veil would be pierced. Recommendations will 
be given at the end of the dissertation in relation to what measures South Africa may adopt and 
how they may reduce the abuse of the corporate structure. 
This chapter established that there are problems associated with limited liability companies and it 
is possible that the problems with the separate legal personality are more complex in the case of 
groups of companies. Therefore next chapter will focus on groups of companies and the 
application of section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008. The next chapter will also include a 





CHAPTER 4: GROUPS OF COMPANIES 
4.1 Introduction 
Now that problems have been noted above in respect of individual companies and the new 
statutory remedy itself, there is the potential that there are more complex problems with respect 
to groups of companies and the application of the new statutory remedy in that context.277 
Chapter 4 will discuss the nature of groups of companies and issue of ‘unconscionable abuse’ in 
the context of groups of companies. The chapter highlights the use of letters of comfort by 
company groups and the legal status thereof. There will be a discussion on how creditors are 
affected by such letters of comfort and the uncertainty surrounding them. It will also be 
questioned whether the use of letters of comfort can constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’ and under 
what circumstances this may occur. If abuse of letters of comfort ever does constitute 
‘unconscionable abuse’ the use of the statutory remedy provided for in s 20(9) will be considered 
in this context. The chapter will also discuss other approaches which the creditors of the 
subsidiary may use in attempting to get the courts to pierce the veil and hold the parent company 
liable for the debts of the subsidiary, especially those debts incurred in reliance on the letters of 
comfort. 
4.2 The nature of groups of companies 
The formation of groups or the linking of companies together into a group structure is common 
commercial practice. The main reason for creating groups of companies is for the parent 
company to minimise risks which it may be exposed to in business transactions since every 
company within the group is a separate entity and liable for its own debts.278 Nevertheless, there 
are definitions that are relevant in this context. 
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Section 1 defines a ‘group of companies’ as a holding company and all of its subsidiaries.279 The 
structure of groups of companies comprises a parent company280 and a subsidiary company or 
subsidiaries.281 Section 1 provides a definition of a ‘holding company’. In relation to a 
subsidiary, ‘holding company’ means ‘a juristic person that controls that subsidiary…’282 In this 
context control means the parent company exercises its voting powers which allow it to appoint 
or elect directors and to enforce its views concerning policies of the subsidiary company.283 
Control also means that the parent company is entitled to receive dividends on its shares.284 
According to Henochsberg, control is defined as the parent company’s power to exercise control 
over a subsidiary’s financial and operating policy so as to reap benefits from the activities of that 
subsidiary.285 Henochsberg further states that ownership does not constitute control.286 
In as much as it is an acceptable commercial approach to have company groups and that although 
companies in the same group may often have a common goal or purpose, the law treats each 
company as a separate legal entity. Each company within a group of companies can acquire its 
own rights and obligations.287 Each company can be sued in its own capacity to the exclusion of 
all other member companies in that group and it would liable for those obligations.288 
Subsequently, each company has liabilities which are separate from other companies within the 
group.289 In a group of companies, if the subsidiary company that is liable cannot pay its 
creditors, normally creditors would not be able to attach the assets of the holding company in 
satisfaction of the debts of the subsidiary.290 
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However, there may be circumstances where perhaps the law should pierce the corporate veil 
and hold the parent company liable for the debts of the subsidiary. This could be where the 
parent company (as the only or perhaps major shareholder) amounts to an ‘unconscionable 
abuse’ of the juristic personality of the subsidiary as a separate entity. These circumstances shall 
be discussed below.  
4.3 Examples of ‘unconscionable abuse’ in the context of groups of companies 
As discussed above, section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008 gives courts the discretion to 
pierce the corporate veil, especially in cases where there is ‘unconscionable abuse’.291. Piercing 
of the corporate veil in terms of section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008 will be discussed in 
the context of groups of companies, making reference to possible circumstances in which the 
corporate veil may be pierced. 
It should be noted that the possible circumstances to be discussed are not a form of categorisation 
because normally each case has to be considered upon its facts. Categorisation may make the 
remedy inflexible and it may even create loopholes in the application of the remedy. 
Categorisation may provide shrewd businessmen with the opportunity of manipulating the 
loopholes. These possible circumstances are discussed in consideration of creditors dealing with 
groups of companies. Since creditors may suffer harm in the event that the controllers of the 
groups of companies abuse the corporate structure, there is the need for creditors to be well 
aware of those possible circumstances that may constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’. With such 
awareness creditors can be encouraged to apply to the courts to pierce the corporate veil in an 
effort to be restored to their original position. 
4.3.1 Abuse of control by the parent company 
The nature of company groups means that the parent company will control the subsidiary and 
control in itself is not the problem. Control is not enough to pierce the veil, but if it moves from 
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control to abuse then it becomes problematic. According to Anderson, in addition to control, it is 
a requirement that an act of wrongdoing on the part of the parent company should be present, 
either through its own actions or through the actions of the board of the subsidiary that it 
controls.292 In such a case, it may happen that the parent company uses the subsidiary to get a 
loan, which does not benefit the subsidiary itself. The subsidiary in this case is acting as a 
servant of the parent company or other companies within the group and cannot be regarded as a 
separate legal entity.293 The subsidiary would not have independent freewill to make decisions on 
its own.294 Therefore, it appears that the manner in which control is exercised determines 
whether it constitutes ‘unconscionable abuse’ and if it does constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’, 
the court may pierce the corporate veil. 
There is a recent case that dealt with piercing of the corporate veil in the context of a trust, 
namely, Van Zyl v Kaye.295 This case may provide insights into the application of the remedy in 
the context of groups of companies because in company law, a trust can operate as a holding 
company since it is regarded as a juristic person.296 The court held that the remedy of piercing 
the corporate veil applies in cases where the wrongdoer avoids liability for a debt or obligation 
by using the corporate structure of a company in a dishonest manner.297 The case provides 
principles which may serve as guidelines in determining what may or may not constitute 
‘unconscionable abuse’. Control becomes ‘unconscionable abuse’ when it has been exercised by 
the defendant to commit a wrong or fraud or to evade a statutory legal duty or unjustly violating 
a plaintiff’s legal rights.298 One may submit that the aggrieved party needs to prove that the 
conduct of the wrongdoer constitutes ‘unconscionable abuse’ for the remedy to apply. 
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4.3.2 Insolvent trading 
Another example of abuse of control is that of allowing the subsidiary to continue trading when 
the parent company is aware that the subsidiary is insolvent. Insolvent trading occurs where the 
holding company or its directors are conscious of or have reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
the subsidiary would become insolvent or that it is actually insolvent when it was dealing with 
creditors.299 If it is apparent that the subsidiary was trading whilst it was insolvent, the aggrieved 
party may apply to court for the piercing of the corporate veil and courts may pierce the veil in 
such circumstances. 
4.3.3 Disregard of the separate legal existence of companies within the group by the 
controllers  
Disregard of separate legal existence of companies may occur in cases where the parent company 
moves assets and liabilities from company to company within the group and this may be done to 
hide the true fiscal position of individual subsidiaries or the entire group, especially from their 
creditors.300 This may lead the parent company to rely on the limited liability of each and every 
company within the group as a way of avoiding liability from external creditors.301 In this case 
the conduct of the company constituted ‘unconscionable abuse’ and the court was justified in 
piercing the corporate veil. 
In Ex parte Gore,302 ‘the controllers of the companies were treating the group in a way that drew 
no proper distinction between the separate personalities of the constituent members’.303 In the 
opinion of the court, this constituted an ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personalities of the 
relevant subsidiary companies by the controllers of the companies.304 The failure of the 
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controllers of the companies to treat the constituent members as separate entities thus brought the 
case within the sphere of the statutory provision.305 Funds requested from investors had been 
moved by the controllers of the holding company between the several companies in the group at 
will.306 The controllers had no regard for the separate legal existence of the companies 
concerned.307 In many instances the documentation purporting to evidence an investment did not 
identify the company in which the particular investment ostensibly was being made.308 The 
invested funds were in fact allocated to any company in the group that required immediate funds 
at the time.309 This transpired without any proper accounting records being kept.310 The court 
found that ‘the flow of funds within the group appeared to have been materially determined by 
the need of the controllers of the group to sustain their scheme by finding money to pay out 
existing investors who wished to withdraw their funds’.311 Accordingly, the court pierced the 
corporate veil and regarded the group of companies as a single entity by ignoring the separate 
legal existence of the subsidiaries concerned.312 The court treated the holding company as if it 
was the only company.313 
While section 20(9) of the Companies Act was applied in this case, it is interesting to compare 
this with the application of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act of 1984 in the case of 
Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim.314 The court in the latter case held in a similar view 
with regards to activity of the controllers that ‘the conducting of the business of the group of 
corporations with scant regard for the separate legal personalities of the individual corporate 
entities of which it was comprised would in itself constitute a gross abuse of the corporate 
personality of all of the entities concerned’.315 It can be argued from the above cases, that the 
courts may pierce the corporate veil in the context of groups of companies if the controllers do 
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not give regard to the separate legal existence of the subsidiary companies within the group of 
companies. 
4.3.4 The parent company financially draining the subsidiary 
Another example of ‘unconscionable abuse’ of a subsidiary company is that of the parent 
company financially draining the subsidiary by taking too many dividends, to such an extent that 
the subsidiary would not be able to repay its loans or its creditors.316 It may be argued that the 
corporate veil may be pierced in such circumstances because there is the disregard of the 
separate legal existence of the subsidiary. It appears that there is also the possibility for courts to 
pierce the corporate veil in circumstances where the parent company drains the subsidiary and 
fails to recapitalise it. This is because such draining may occur in such a manner that the parent 
company actually accounts for the profits of the subsidiary as its own, thereby disregarding the 
separate existence of the subsidiary. The subsidiary may not be able to meet its financial 
obligations and an aggrieved party may apply for the piercing of the corporate veil. 
4.3.5 Proving fraud 
The corporate veil may be pierced in circumstances where a subsidiary has been formed and/or 
used to commit fraud or for some other illegitimate purpose.317 A parent company may establish 
subsidiaries for the purposes of committing fraud and the corporate veil may be pierced in such 
circumstances.318 There is also the possibility that the subsidiary may present itself as the parent 
company and vice versa, in an effort to avoid certain regulations or corporate formalities.319 In 
Ex parte Gore320 the court stated that the corporate veil has been pierced in a number of cases 
which involved fraud or other improper conduct.321 Fraud may also occur in instances where the 
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parent company or the subsidiary or the entire group does not keep proper accounting records for 
their business affairs with the purpose of concealing fraud or improper conduct.322  
In the case of VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp,323 a question was raised that, ‘if a 
person used a puppet company to enter into a contract with a third party in order to perpetrate 
fraud on that third party, can the court pierce the corporate veil and treat the person as a party to 
the contract?’324 The court answered the question in the negative on the basis that the law of tort 
afforded VTB a remedy for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation and there was no proof of 
use of the corporation as a mere façade to conceal the true facts.325 However, in relation to the 
above mentioned case, the court in Exparte Gore326 expressed that if section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act 2008 was applicable, the English Supreme court in the case of VTB Capital plc v 
Nutritek International Corp may have come to a different conclusion.327 One may argue, in 
support of what the court said in Exparte Gore,328 that if a corporate entity is used as a puppet 
company and there is proof that it is just a mere façade, the corporate veil may be pierced on the 
basis that such conduct may constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’. 
4.3.6 Mere façade or sham 
The mere façade or sham principles have been discussed before in chapter 2.  In this case it is 
being discussed in the context of the parent-subsidiary relationship. A subsidiary can be held by 
courts to have been established as a mere façade when it is used by the parent company as any 
instrument to hide the identity of the actual person acting or doing the transactions.329 In such a 
case the courts may pierce the corporate veil to reveal the identity of the actual party to the 
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transaction, that is, the parent company. The aggrieved party needs to prove that the parent 
company was merely using the subsidiary as an instrument to conceal its own identity. One may 
argue that an aggrieved party can apply to court for the piercing of the corporate veil to reveal 
the true identity of the parent company so that it can be held liable for the debt. 
In the case of Van Zyl v Kaye330 there is a discussion of how the courts may determine what a 
‘sham’ is with respect to a trust. The court stated that ‘in determining that a trust is a sham there 
must be a finding that the requirements for establishing a trust were not met or compliance with 
the requirements was done in pretence or as a way of deceit.’331 This may constitute 
‘unconscionable abuse’ of the trust form and in such a case the courts to pierce the corporate 
veil. The court in Van Zyl v Kaye332 further stated that when the trust form is abused, generally it 
is the case that the trustees would have treated the property of the trust as if it was their own 
personal property.333 Therefore, one may submit that there may be the need for the applicant to 
prove that the trust form was used in a dishonest manner in an effort to avoid liabilities or 
obligations. 
One may argue that the principles highlighted in the paragraph above are applicable in 
determining what may constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’ in the context of companies and groups 
of companies. One may argue that there is a possibility that the parent company which is a sole 
shareholder of a subsidiary may have formed the subsidiary with the intention to use it to avoid 
liabilities or obligations, thereby hiding behind the veil of incorporation. Such conduct may 
constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’ and the courts may pierce the corporate veil. 
There is, therefore, the need for creditors to base their claims on the conduct of the parent 
company to pierce the corporate veil, especially in cases where such conduct mentioned in the 
examples above would constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’.334 The remedy would allow for the 
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creditor to obtain an order from the court to have the parent company meet the financial 
obligations of the subsidiary so as to remedy the wrong done by the parent company. 
4.4 Possible unconscionable abuse of letters of comfort by groups of companies 
Parent companies follow the trend of issuing letters of comfort rather than guarantees. As 
mentioned above in chapter 1, letters of comfort are issued by parent companies to lenders in 
support of loans granted to their subsidiaries.  Lenders and third parties that accept letters of 
comfort need to be aware of the potential problems that arise as a result of the use and 
acceptance of these letters. 
A letter of comfort is a document issued by a parent company in place of a guarantee to inspire a 
lender to do business with its subsidiary.335 These letters of comfort differ from guarantees in 
that they are not legally binding.336 Because the letter of comfort is not legally enforceable, it 
does not create legal obligations for the issuing company.337 Bradgate and White refer to the 
letter of comfort as ‘a means of reassuring creditors that their loan or credit facilities will be 
repaid without actually guaranteeing repayment’.338 In other words, letters of comfort do not give 
a creditor the repayment assurance which it requires from the issuing company. Therefore, there 
is a need to determine whether the corporate veil may be pierced because of ‘unconscionable 
abuse’ of letters of comfort, since letters of comfort offer little or no enforceability. 
4.4.1 Unconscionable abuse through use of letters of comfort 
The conduct of the parent company is of importance in determining whether or not to pierce the 
corporate veil. An example of a case where the use of a letter of comfort may potentially 
constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’ is that of a parent company which issues a letter of comfort 
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and then proceeds to dispose of its shares in the subsidiary or withdraws its financial support 
from its subsidiary. In this case the subsidiary probably would not have been self-sufficient yet 
and would eventually be unable to meet its financial obligations. This would prejudice creditors 
as they would be left to sue a company which is penniless. The court may find such conduct as 
constituting unconscionable abuse and eventually piercing the corporate veil to remedy the 
wrongful conduct by the parent company. 
It is possible that the parent company may issue a letter of comfort whilst manipulating the credit 
of its subsidiary knowing that the letter of comfort may not give rise to legal obligations.339 The 
motive for this would be to get finance which would not benefit the investors and stakeholders of 
the subsidiary.340 If the aggrieved party is successful in proving such abuse, it may be argued that 
under South African company law, abuse of the corporate structure of a subsidiary may be 
regarded as ‘unconscionable abuse’. Once the courts draw such an inference, the corporate veil 
may be pierced in terms of section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008.341  
Another case is when a parent company states that ‘it will provide its subsidiary with sufficient 
means to fulfil their financial obligations and it will act accordingly during the course of the 
bank’s loan.’342  This statement may look as if it has similar implications to the one in the above 
paragraph, but such a statement may impose a duty on the parent company not to financially 
cripple its subsidiary to the extent that it becomes unable to meet its financial obligations,343 for 
example, by taking dividends during the course of the bank loan leaving the subsidiary 
financially drained.344 If the parent company drags its subsidiary into bankruptcy or causes it to 
trade whilst insolvent, such conduct may constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’ within the company 
laws of South Africa. In this case the parent company may be rendered liable for the debt of the 
subsidiary. The courts of South Africa may then exercise their discretion and pierce the corporate 
veil to render the parent company liable for the debt of its subsidiary. 
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The chapter discussed the nature of groups of companies and issue of ‘unconscionable abuse’ in 
the context of groups of companies. The application of section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 
2008 was discussed taking into consideration instances that may constitute ‘unconscionable 
abuse’ in the context of groups of companies. The chapter established that the parent company 
may manipulate the corporate structure of its subsidiary or subsidiaries and that if the conduct of 
the parent company constitutes ‘unconscionable abuse’ the courts of South Africa may pierce the 
corporate veil. There was a consideration of recent cases, that is, the Exparte Gore case and the 
Van Zyl case. The Van Zyl case, which dealt with piercing of the corporate veil of the trust, was 
considered so that it provides a guideline as to the application of section 20(9) of the Companies 
Act to groups of companies because in terms of company law a trust can operate as a parent 
company of a subsidiary. It has been established that a subsidiary may be formed with the 
intention to use it to avoid liabilities or obligations and such conduct may constitute 
‘unconscionable abuse’ and the courts may pierce the corporate veil in terms of section 20(9) of 
the Companies Act of 2008. 
As discussed above, parent companies at times issue letters of comfort instead of guarantees and 
it has been established that, due to the uncertainty of the legal status of letters of comfort, these 
letters have the potential of being abused. The potential abuse of letters of comfort which may 
lead to creditors suffering loss and this creates the need for a solution to creditors. From the 
discussion above, it is clear that letters of comfort do not create legally binding contractual 
obligations, thereby allowing the issuing company to avoid liability for the debt of its subsidiary. 
However, there are circumstances where the letters of comfort create legal relations. 
The chapter established that it is difficult or close to impossible for a creditor to make an 
application to court for the piercing of the corporate veil basing on a letter of comfort because 
letters of comfort are not legally binding and the mere issuing of a letter of comfort cannot, in 
itself, be considered as conduct constituting ‘unconscionable abuse on the part of the parent 
company. It has been established that the creditor has to base their claim on the conduct of the 
parent company and in this case there should be a nexus between the conduct of the parent 
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company and the issuing of the letter of comfort. Once the creditor proves that the conduct of the 
parent company constituted ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the corporate form, then the courts may 
exercise their discretion to pierce the corporate veil. 
Having established the above, the next chapter concludes the dissertation and provides 
recommendations for creditors when dealing with letters of comfort. The next chapter will also 
give recommendations for approaches of the court when dealing with groups of companies 
especially in cases where there is the use of letters of comfort by the parent company. The next 
chapter will also provide recommendations for the legislature in relation to the regulation of 










CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The concepts of limited liability and of a company’s separate legal existence are intertwined. 
These fundamental concepts regulate the way in which a company functions. As discussed in 
chapter 1, limited liability enables shareholders to protect their personal assets in the event that 
the company fails. In this case, shareholders lose only the capital that they invested. Furthermore, 
risk may be transferred to the creditors, for example, in the event of liquidation of the company, 
creditors may bear most of the costs of liquidation. The problem may become more complex in 
the context of groups of companies because the possibility of parent companies abusing the 
corporate form of its subsidiary is higher than the possibility of abuse in the context of an 
individual company. The abuse of the corporate form has been discussed in chapter 2 and courts, 
together with the legislature, have acknowledged the existence of abuse of the corporate form. 
In the event of abuse of the corporate form, there is an exception to the doctrine of limited 
liability and separate legal personality of a company, namely, the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil as indicated in chapter 2. The doctrine applies in circumstances which justify its 
application. In South Africa, the piercing of the corporate veil started as a common law remedy 
and has recently developed into a statutory remedy applying to companies. The new statutory 
remedy is encapsulated in section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 2008. The remedy has been 
discussed as a solution available to aggrieved creditors who suffered harm due to the abuse of the 
corporate form of a company, especially in the context of groups of companies. 
This dissertation has set out to explore the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil as a new 
statutory remedy, paying particular attention to groups of companies. The focus on groups of 
companies further included the use of letters of comfort which parent companies issue rather 
than issuing a guarantee to support a loan taken by the subsidiary. The question addressed is 
whether creditors can apply for the piercing of the corporate veil based on a letter of comfort in 
circumstances where they suffer harm as a result of the abuse of the nature of the letter of 
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comfort. The dissertation considers creditors and aims to provide piercing the corporate veil as a 
solution for the aggrieved creditors when the corporate form has been abused causing them to 
suffer harm. 
5.2 Findings 
The dissertation has discussed the meaning of the new statutory remedy and the meaning of 
‘unconscionable abuse’ in general. The study deliberated on the procedure taken in applying to 
courts for the piecing of the corporate veil. The procedure also shed light on the meaning of the 
statutory remedy in its entirety. It has been established that, unlike the common law remedy, the 
statutory remedy is readily available in the sense that it can be applied when the circumstances 
justify it. It has also been established that the statutory remedy has not replaced the common law 
remedy, but it is complementary to it. In the event that the requirements of the statutory remedy 
are not met, the common law remedy can be relied on. 
In relation to the application of the remedy both in the context of individual companies and 
groups of companies, it has been highlighted in chapter 3 and 4, that a flexible approach is 
preferable as compared to the categorisation approach. It has been established that the 
categorisation approach may open doors for manipulation of loopholes that may be created. A 
flexible approach in terms of common law was brought to light in the case of Cape Lubner345 
and such an approach is necessary both for the common law and the statutory remedy because it 
allows for the courts to look at each case upon its own facts. 
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 has brought clarity and some certainty to the remedy in 
the sense that courts now have the discretion to pierce the corporate veil. However, the statutory 
provision does not provide for the meaning of the phrase ‘unconscionable abuse’. The term has 
been discussed in chapter 3 and it has been established that it is different from the term 
‘unconscionable injustice’, which was a test applied in the case of Hulse-Rueter.346 
‘Unconscionable abuse’ refers to the nature of the conduct and ‘unconscionable injustice’ refers 
                                                 
345 Cape Pacific (note 10 above; 805). 
346 Botha (note 31 above; 525). 
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to the result of the conduct. Thus, the former is what helps the courts determine whether the 
statutory remedy of piercing the corporate veil applies to a specific set of facts or not. 
It has been highlighted in chapter 3 that the new statutory remedy is slightly similar to the 
remedy of piercing the corporate veil applied to close corporations found in section 65 of the 
Close Corporations Act of 1984. However, the difference between these two provisions is that 
the term ‘gross abuse’ is used in section 65 of the Close Corporations Act of 1984 and the 
corporate veil of a close corporation was pierced in the case of gross abuse of the corporate form. 
The circumstances under which the corporate veil was pierced in terms of the Close Corporations 
Act of 1984 serve as guidelines to the interpretation of section 20(9) of the Companies Act of 
2008. It has been established that the use of the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ may also allow for 
creditors to have unqualified availability of the statutory remedy despite having access to 
alternative remedies. 
Chapter 4 dealt with groups of companies and the application of the statutory remedy in that 
context. It was established, in chapter 4, that it is possible for the parent company to manipulate 
the separate legal existence of its subsidiary or subsidiaries and that this manipulation may be 
seen by courts as the disregard of the separate juristic personality of the subsidiary. If such 
conduct is proven to have perpetrated, it should constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’ and the courts 
of South Africa should pierce the corporate veil.  
Chapter 4 included a discussion of the use and possible abuse of letters of comfort by groups of 
companies, especially the parent company. It has been established that the legal status of letters 
of comfort is uncertain since they do not create any legal obligations. This allows the issuing 
company to avoid liability for the debt of its subsidiary because the issuing of a letter of comfort 
creates a moral obligation which the parent company does not have to legally fulfil. It is rather 
unfortunate that the corporate veil may not be pierced based on the letter of comfort and it may 
only be pierced based on the conduct of the parent company, such conduct having to be 
‘unconscionable conduct’. Examples of conduct which may constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’ in 
relation to  transactions involving letters of comfort have been highlighted in chapter 4 to 
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encourage them to apply the remedy and to make them aware of the bases upon which they can 
apply to the courts to pierce the corporate veil. 
5.3 Recommendations 
Based on the findings of this dissertation summarised above, recommendations for the benefit of 
creditors and courts on the interpretation of the new statutory remedy with regard to groups of 
companies and also the use of letters of comfort will be presented in this section. 
5.3.1 Piercing of the corporate veil of groups of companies vs individual companies 
There is also the application of the statutory remedy in the context of groups of companies and 
the rules that apply stem from those that apply in the general context of an individual company. 
The rules that apply to individual companies are adequate as a starting point when dealing with a 
group of companies, but it may however be necessary to consider groups of companies in their 
own context. The reason is that the parent companies benefit from the transactions made by the 
subsidiary, which encourages them to conduct dangerous and risky activities through subsidiary 
companies, in some instances, with very little capitalisation and a large sum of debt.347 In some 
cases, the large debt is supported by a letter of comfort, which has a legal status which is 
uncertain. When the parent company is not liable for the debt as a surety and has manipulated the 
credit of the subsidiary creditors lose out on their monies because separate legal existence 
protects the parent company. This, therefore, means that South African courts need to stay on 
their guard when dealing with cases involving groups of companies so as to protect the interests 
of creditors. The dissertation recommends that the corporate veil be pierced because 
manipulation of subsidiaries and disregard of the separate legal existence of the subsidiary 
should constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’ and section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 should 
apply. 
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5.3.2 Conduct of parent companies as the sole basis for piercing of the corporate veil 
There are alternative approaches are recommended for creditors to deal with the problem of their 
inability to piece the corporate veil whilst attempting to base the application on a letter of 
comfort. Creditors should base their application on the conduct of the parent company or the 
group of companies as a whole. An example discussed above is that of a parent company which 
exercises excessive control of the subsidiary to such an extent that the subsidiary loses it freewill 
to independently make decisions. The excessive control may be exercised to hide some fraud 
which may have been committed through the use of the subsidiary or the group as a whole. Such 
conduct should be considered by courts as constituting ‘unconscionable abuse’ and the corporate 
veil should be pierced if the aggrieved creditor proves that there has been excessive control of 
the subsidiary exercised to commit and hide fraud. 
5.4 Contribution of the study 
This dissertation is an exploratory and analytical study aimed at providing guidelines on the 
application of the new statutory remedy, especially in the context of groups of companies. The 
dissertation is both descriptive and explanatory. It outlines the development of the remedy of 
piercing of the corporate veil in South Africa and explains its application in the general context 
and in the context of groups of companies. It takes into account the use of letters of comfort by 
groups of companies and explored the legal status of letters of comfort within the corporate laws 
of South Africa. There was also an exploration of the possibility of the ‘unconscionable abuse’ of 
letters of comfort and also the possibility of piercing the corporate veil basing on the issuing of 
the letter of comfort by a parent company. In the event that the corporate veil cannot be pierced 
basing on a letter of comfort, the conduct of the parent company was recommended as a basis for 
the application since the test to pierce the corporate veil in terms of section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act of 2008 is ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality of a company. The 
aim was to bring awareness to creditors on the possibility of piercing the corporate veil and 
encouraging them to apply the remedy when the circumstances seem to justify it. 
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It is recommended that further study be conducted on the operation of groups of companies and 
the possibility of developing the corporate laws of South Africa to accommodate the problems 
that are associated with groups of companies since they cannot exactly be treated the same as 
individual companies. 
5.5 Conclusion 
By piercing the corporate veil the courts ensure that a corporate group seeking the benefits of 
limited liability also admits the parallel responsibilities.348 This allows for court to remedy the 
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